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The Pure Theory of Country Risk
This paper attempts to survey, and to put into perspective, recent
literature that has analyzed the nature of credit relations between developed
ensuring that the two sides of a loan contract
that the borrower repays the lender and the lenders can commit themselves to
penalize the borrower if he does not.1
I. Introduction
In the early 1980's, several LDC'swithvery large debts to foreign
banks did not meet the payments schedules to whichthey had originally
agreed. Various participants in, and observers of, these marketsbegan
to speak of a crisis, one which they feared might shake thebanking
system of the developed countries. So far there has been no dramatic
event to resolve the status of these loans. The absence ofovert clues
to what will happen to those involved with these debtsgenerates a wide-
spread interest in a conceptual framework useful in interpreting the
current situation.
In this paper, we seek to articulatevery general principles for
looking at the most essential problems posed by internationallending,
ones that will be common to the relationships of mostsovereign debtors
and their creditors. This set of £oncepts isa necessary, although
admittedly not a sufficient, tool kit for understanding current events
and prescribing public policy.
Our concern, then, is with the pure theory ofsovereign lending or
country risk. We discuss the roles of borrowers, of lenders and of the
various public authorities who mediate between the twogroups, or
regulate the lenders, or insure deposits in the banks. We make use of
the literature on LDC indebtedness, which is related to recent advances
in the general theory of credit markets. This work, inturn,
incorporates recent advances in the general theory of the economics of
information and the theory of games.
Loans are a particular contractual arrangement between suppliers of
capital and the users of capital. The borrower promises to pay the
lender certain amounts at certain times. A paramount concern in2
designing the contract is that the borrower may not be able toor may not
wish to make payments under certain circumstances. Thepossibility that
the lender will not recover his money is reflected notonly in a high
interest rate, but in the covenants of the loan contract. Thepurpose of
these covenants is to protect the lender byprecluding the borrower from
engaging in certain activities, and ensuring that heengages in others.
The loan contract also stipulates conditions under whichthe lender can
intervene, e.g., in the event of a default on another loan.
Credit markets, like labor markets, are characterizedby implicit as
well as explicit contracts. For example, it isfrequently the case that
a lender makes a short-term loan for a long-term investment. Thereis an
understanding that the loan will be renewed, except under unusual circum-
stances. The advantage of the short-term contract is that thelender can
insist on additional restrictions on the borrower torenew the loan. To
stipulate all of these restrictions on a conditional4jasjsbeforehand, at
the time of the original loan, would have beenvirtually impossible.
What prevents the lender froii taking unfairadvantage of the borrower
are, as usual, reputation and competition from other lenders.
Consequently, the distinction between equity and debt, that the
borrower is required to repay the principal plus intereston the latter
and not on the former, becomes somewhat blurred.Though indeed the
borrower is required to service a debt, there isno way that, in general,
the borrower can be forced to do so under allcontingencies. Debt and
equity are both contingent claims, although they clearly differ in the
nature of the contingencies involved. What factors areobservable, and
therefore can be used to condition contractualobligations, is an impor-
tant determinant of the relationship between debtors and creditors.3
1.1 Defining Default
We have not, so far, said what we mean by default. In a two-period
model of the economy, default may easily be defined: Whenever the
borrower gives resources to the lender that are less than the fixed
amount that he is committed to pay the lender, then there isa default.
In multi-period models, however, the concept is somewhatmore
elusive. A default occurs whenever the lender formally declares that the
borrower has violated a certain condition of the loan.' A loanmay be
declared in default when a borrower refuses (or is unable) topay another
loan. The lender does not have to declare a loan indefault, however;
the contract only provides him the right to do so.
Thus, in most situations, a default is a result of a set of
decisions, not the mechanical realization of some outcome. The proximate
cause is generally the result of the horrower's decision not to make all
or part of a loan payment that is due. But that decision, inturn, is
frequently the result of the lender's decision not to extend further
credit.
When the relationship between debtor and creditorcan, in principle,
last beyond the period in question, a violation of therepayment
schedule, with or without a default, is neither necessary nor sufficient
for the lender to realize less than the (present-discounted) value of the
loan. A failure to make current payments does not necessarily imply that
future payments will not be .ade, and conversely. This is one reasonwhy
observers of, and participants in, the market cannotexpect any very
overt sign of the status of these loans.
There is therefore an ilportant difference between two-period and
finite horizon, but multi-period, models. Furthermore, as we shall show,4
finite-horizonand infinite-horizon models can have qualitatively quite
different properties when lenders can only ensure repayment through
exclusion from future borrowing.
Much of the recent literature has failed to recognize these aspects
of default. Thus, some writers attempt to relate default to insolvency,
which arises in the case of unsecured loans when the borrower's debt
exceeds his net worth (presumably inclusive of the debt). This is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the declaration of a default. The
declaration of a default usually has a large cost associated with it; an
ongoing firm is almost always worth more than the value of its assets
sold in a bankruptcy sale.2 And in international banking, declarations
of default may trigger certain actions of bank regulators that are costly
to lenders, in the firs.t instance, and possibly to debtors as a
consequence. What is at stake is rnore than the distribution of claims
between debtors and creditors. More importantly, ma formal sense,
insolvency is not really an issue in lending. to foreign governlnents. The
debt of a country in almost all instances is less than the value of the
assets owned by nationals and the government of the country. There may
be limits on the extent to which governments can appropriate the assets,
but these limits themselves are, in general, not hard and fast
constraints, but involve trade-off s.3
While some writers have linked default to insolvency, others have
linked it to illiquidity. A borrower with a positive net worth who
cannot convert the required portion of his net worth into a means of
payment is said to be illiquid. The question is: why would no supplier
of capital be willing to supply credit, if it were unambiguously clear
what the net worth of the asset were? Frequently, it is the withdrawalS
of credit that leads to the borrower's illiquidity; but it is precisely
this withdrawal of credit that the theory should explain.
1.2 Domestic Versus International Lending
The ambiguity in the notion of default is relevant to both domestic
and international lending. But there are also very important differences
between the two, with consequences for the applicability of various
concepts. We review briefly three problems traditionally addressed in
theories of credit markets: enforcement, moral hazard and adverse
selection.
One problem in all lending is enforcement, the difficulty in ensur-
ing that both sides of a contract adhere to its terms. Here, the partic-
ular concern is the difficulty of ensuring that the borrower pays the
lender. The major difference between domestic and international debt is
that the former are legal obligations, enforceable in courts. Another
difference is that, domestically, debtors who cannot meet their
obligations have the option of filing for bankruptcy. Repayment of
international debt, however, is largely voluntary; the penalties to be
imposed on a country that does not honor a contract are, at best,
indirect. On the other hand, there is no systematic procedure
corresponding to bankruptcy, by which a country that has undertaken an
excessive amount of debt can discharge its obligations and proceed on its
way.
For similar reasons, collateral, which can be important
domestically, plays little role in internationallending.4 If the
collateral is retained in the borrowing country, there is no mechanism by
which the creditor can seize it.If the collateral is moved outside the
country where the creditor can seize it, the borrower will usuallylose6
fully the use of it, so that the value of the loan is reduced by the
value of the collateral.5 A fully and effectively collateralized loan
would then be of no value to the borrower. As we shall see, the
inability to provide collateral may significantly exacerbate the problems
facing credit market participants.
When making loans to borrowers within the developed countries, lenders
need to pay relatively little attention to enforcement problems, but
instead must worry about problems of moral hazard. These arise because
it is difficult for the lender to monitor actions of the borrower to
ensure that they do not affect adversely the prospects for debt service.
For instance, a firm may have an investment opportunity with low expected
return, but with the possibility of a high return under some circumstanc-
es. In the good states, the firm pays its creditors and reaps large net
benefits; otherwise, the firm goes bankrupt, and the creditor loses.
Such a project may be quite attractive to the firm, a'lthough quite
undesirable from the creditor's viewpoint.
In international loans, such problems are much less prominent in the
relationship between country borrowers and their creditors. As we have
argued, the resources of the debtor are likely to be adequate to repay
the loans regardless. In a sense, it is the very importance of the
enforcement problem that, as we shall explain, keeps creditors from ever
lending so much that moral hazard problems involving choice among risky
investments become central. On the other hand, moral hazard problems may
arise if (1) borrowers can affect their susceptibility to penalties that
enforce payment; or (2) they can affect the likelihood that creditors
will impose penalties (if creditors cannot precommit fully); or (3) the
total amount that they have borrowed cannot be observed by individual7
lenders. In each of these situations, borrowers' actions affect the
probability of payment.
Moral hazard issues also arise in the relationship between banks and
the governmental insurers of bank deposits. This insurance obviates the
need for depositors to monitor adequately bank portfolios. There is a
consequent incentive for banks to lend in a risky fashion, hoping for big
profits but able to transfer large losses to their insurers. The
traditional role for bank regulators is to prevent these actions by rules
on portfolio composition, but these have been loosely designed, and have
not prevented the lending of multiples of bank capital to LDC's.
A third set of problems facing lenders are ones of adverse selec-
tion. Here the difficulty is one of ascertaining the characteristics of
a borrower, both transitory and permanent, -relevant to designing a
repayment schedule and judging whether.aborrower will adhere to it.
Without this ability, the lender is vulnerable to atttacting only those
borrowers who know that their. repayment prospects are poor or who c1ain
that they cannot pay when they can. In many cases, however, outside
lenders are as fully informed as domestic politicians about the country's
economic situation, and so adverse selection may be less important
internationally than domestically.
In our view, then, the problems of moral hazard and adverse
selection deserve attention, but really central to— our understanding of
credit relations between developed and developing countries is
identifying the incentives for borrowers to repay, and for suppliers of
capital to continue supplying capital. As we shall show, actions of the
borrower (or lender) may affeét these incentives. To the extent that
borrowers can take actions that increase the likelihood€hat they will8
repay their loans, they will be better off. By doing so, they can
increase the willingness of lenders to lend. Similarly, to the extent
that lenders take actions that increase the likelihood that they will
continue to renew the loans, borrowers may be more willing to borrow and
repay.
II. The Willingness-to-Pay of Borrowers
In the introduction, we sketched our basic view, that in most
situations, what happens to a loan is a result of a series of decisions,
not the mechanical realization of some outcome. Thus, the analysis of
international credit markets must focus on how borrowers and lenders make
their decisions. Surprisingly, a few simple notions can help to delimit
the possible relationships between debtors and creditors. For instance,
the fact that loans are voluntary rules out situations in which all
future net transfers as of any date are always from the lender to the
borrower. Later on, we show that in an important class of models, ñèt
transfers also cannot always be from the borrower to the lender.
In this section, we focus on the behavior of borrowers, and in the
next section, we turn to the lenders. In a fundamental sense, the
dichotomy is artificial: A borrower's willingness to pay depends criti-
cally on his beliefs about (1) the lender's resolve to penalize a recal-
citrant borrower, and (2) the lender's willingness to lend in the future.
For now, we assume that the potential penalties we discuss will always be
imposed.9
11.1. The General Structure of Models With Penalties
We begin with an extremely simple two-period model. A loan of
amount L is made in the first period with an obligation to repay r(L) in
the second period. The model ends after the second period, so that there
are no further considerations that affect the participants.
If the borrower does not discharge this obligation, he suffers a
penalty, P expressed in the same units as r(L). The borrower's welfare
is a function U[L, xl which increases with the amount borrowed, L, and
decreases in the obligation imposed by the loan, x, where
r(L) if he repays
(1) x —
P if he defaults.
The borrower who defaults receives total utility of
(2) Ud =U[L,P1





The borrower chooses to pay if
(4) Up >Ud.
This comparison of alternatives is at the heart of a wiliingneSStOPaY
approach.10
Under the assumptions that lenders are competitive and face an
opportunity cost of funds of i, the repayment lenders require is
(5) r(L) =(1+i)L.
Substituting (1), (2), (3), and (5) into (4) implies that repayment
occurs for
(6) L <P/(1+i).
As long as lenders understand the borrower1s situation some central
conclusions follow:
(1) Borrowers may be credit constrained. If the borrower wishes to
borrow a little more than P/(1+i) at rate i, he cannot. On the other
hand, the borrower need not wish to borrow as much a"he can.
(2) There is never any inconsistency between a loan contract that says
the loan must be repaid with interest at rate i and what happens.
(3) Penalties are never imposed.
(4) If the borrower wants to borrow more, he benefits from an increase
in the penalty P.
(5)If there is no penalty, one observes no lending rather than a rash
of loan-contract violations. At its simplest, willingness-to-pay is a
theory of rationing, not one of lender losses.
We use the simple model and its conclusions as a mechanism to organize
other formulations of the willingness-to-pay approach.
For instance, one modification that undermines the fourth conclusion
on the welfare effects of enhanced penalties, while maintaining the11
others, can occur if the borrower is large, or if we consider
simultaneous increases in the penalties applied to a large number of
borrowers. An increase in P may then raise the world interest rate, to
the borrowers' detriment. In the extreme, if funds available for this
kind of lending are fixed, an increase in P raises i without raising L.
11.2 Models with Uncertainty
Next, we begin to introduce uncertainty into the model, otherwise
returning to all the assumptions of eqs. (1) -(5).For simplicity,
assume that the penalty depends on the state of nature, s,
(la) P =P(s).
Utility of the borrower if he defa,Uts is
(2a) Ud =U[L,P,s],
and if he does not
(3a) U U[L,r(L),s],
where the argument s indicates that utility may depend on s in other ways
than through P. Note, however, that r(L), the amount of payment, does
not depend on s.
The debtor pays off his obligations in all states s in S for which
(4a) U >
Ud12
and otherwise not, for s in S'. The borrower's expected utility is
5Uf(s)ds + 5Uf(S)dS
S SI
where f(s) is the probability of state s.If lenders are competitive,
risk-neutral and face a constant cost of funds i then
(5a) it r(L) =(1+i)L
where the probability of repayment is
(7a) it =5 f(s)ds.
S
The existence of uncertainty means that payment may not be made, and
the penalty may be imposed. An increase in the penalty need not increase
a borrower's expected utility. While it will normally increase the
amount lent, to the borrower's benefit, in those states when the country
does not pay it may be worse off.6
On the other hand, uncertainty need not imply it < 1 if the repayment
schedule can also be made contingent on the state of nature. In this
case, the state contingent repayment, r(L,s), is chosen so that > Ud
for all s. This is the approach taken by Grossman and Van Huyck (1985).
The explicit legal contract, however, conventionally specifies a single
interest rate (or a single spread above the market rate). Lenders do not
have the scope to revise the contractual interest rate upward, unless the
borrower violates the contract. The contractually specified payment must
therefore be the maximum of payments in all possible states,13
r+(L) =maxr (L,s). Any state s with r(L,s) <r+could then be
called a situation of excusable default, in the Grossman-Van Huyck
terminology. Penalties are only imposed if the country pays less than
r(L,s), not less than r+. This is one interpretation of the current
reschedulings. It presupposes that the state s can be observed byboth
parties after the fact, and that disputes over what has happeneddo not
arise. The issue therefore remains of what situations can be used to
condition contracts.
A further set of complications arise if the actions by the borrower
can affect the burden of the penalty. Actions that lenders perceive as
increasing the burden may improve the terms of loans. To do sosuch
actions must be observable by the lender and costly to reverse. Actions
that are unobservable but still raise the burden of the penalty give rise
to a whole range of moral hazard issues (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981and
1983).
11.3. The Nature of Penalties
The simple models just discussed do not show how the penalty origi-
nates; its size is exogenously given and does not depend onthe charac-
teristics of debtors or creditors. In fact, however, we believethat the
penalties available to creditors are rather indirect,and that
identifying their ultimate implications for debtors is oneof the basic
issues in the pure theory of country risk. Only by modelingthe penalty
realistically can one tell which countries are most susceptibleto them.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981b) discuss some of the legislationthat
potentially provides for penalties imposed by the U.S. government,while
Kaletsky (1985) provides a comprehensive review ofthe relevant legal,14
institutional and political issues. What concerns us here are two types
of exclusions that creditors can potentially impose ondebtors: (1) an
embargo of future borrowing, and (2) various formsof interference with
the debtors' international transactions and transfers.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) consider what it means to a borrowerto
be excluded from future loans. Some very simple situations inwhich such
a penalty has no force can be mentioned. First,such a penalty only
makes sense in a model with an infinite horizon. If there were alast
period, no loans would be repaid in that period sincethere would be no
future exclusion to worry about. Lenders knowing this would nevermake a
loan coming due in this period. But, this in turn would render athreat
of exclusion meaningless from the viewpoint of the penultimate period, so
no loan coming due in this period would be possible.And so on, by
backward induction, the penalty would be unable to support any lending.
Second, even in an infinite-horizon world, such a penaltywould be
ineffective if the model ever predicts that a point will be reachedafter
which the flow will always be from debtor to creditor, via arguments
similar to those just made.
It is only when the future always holds some possibility of trans-
fers in both directions that this penalty becomes operative. It isfor
this reason that Eaton and Gersovitz focus on a model in which theincome
of the borrower alternates between low and high values, eitherin a
deterministic or stochastic way. If borrowers are risk averse,the
demand for loans derives from a desire for consumption smoothing.The
cost of the denial of credit is that the country must resortto other
methods for consumption smoothing (e.g., building up stockpiles), orit
must accept a greater fluctuation in its consumption pattern.15
If lenders are risk neutral and borrowers risk averse, the lenders
can smooth borrowers' consumption at no cost tothemselves. In effect,
the penalty is the loss of consumers' surplus on being excluded fromthe
market; it is inframarginal from the borrower's viewpoint.The penalty
(and hence the supply of credit) is higher the greater the cost tothe
borrower of exclusion, which in turn is higher: (1) the greater the
borrower's elasticity of marginal utility; (2) the more variable its
income; (3) the lower the cost of smoothing via theinternational capital
market, i.e. the lower the world interest rate; and (4) the morelimited
are domestically available options for smoothing consumption.A country
with limited risk aversion may still want to make great use of the
possibilities for consumption smoothing afforded byinternational lending
if its income is highly variable. The cost of losing this option may not
be large, however, so that the current- demand for the facility is not
necessarily related to the penalty occasioned by the 1oss.
Uncertainty, or at least income variation, seems crucialfor the
penalty of exclusion to have force. By contrast, the argumentis
sometimes made informally that countries that need funds for development
are likely to suffer if denied loans. It is true that they maybenefit
greatly from being able to borrow, but this is not the same assaying
that the penalty of exclusion can assure the lender that hewill be
repaid. Borrowing for capital accumulation or productiveinvestment
implies that a point will be reached beyond whichthe debtor will begin
making transfers to his creditor. Once the marginal productof capital
equals the interest rate, there will be no further gainto moving capital
to the debtor. At this point, the debtor will lose nothingby being
denied access to credit markets, and will refuse to servicehis debts.16
And, by backward induction as before, it will never be possible to lend
with prospects of payment.
Owners of capital can entrust it to others who have the opportunity
for profitable investment, and obtain payment by threatening exclusion
from future access to capital, but in situations that do not seem
relevant to financial lenders. Allen (1983) discusses how landowners may
be able to ensure that they are paid even if those who use their land
could, in principle, abscond without paying their rents. In his model,
the land must be left behind, and those who do not pay landlords cannot
get land to farm in the future. As a result, they may have diminished
income opportunities in the future, in which case the penalty has
deterrent value.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) discuss a model of direct foreign invest-
ment. In this case, capital depreciates and cannot be replaced without
the help of foreign investors. If they are expropriated, foreign inves-
tors refuse to cooperate, and exclude the countryfromthe market fZor
physicalcapital in the future. Here again, financial lenders do not
seem able to impose such a penalty package.
International lending appears to play an important role in financing
international trade. Borrowing does not simply finance the current
account deficit, but is associated with the level of international
purchases. In principle, a country could trade on the basis of barter,
but to do so is likely to be costly. Kraft (1984) reports that Nexican
officials perceived the disruption of trade as the primary cost of
default. Iran, when faced with a temporary credit embargo, found trade
difficult, even though the country was a net creditor.17
When countries can anticipate problems in effecting transactions,
however, they can act to shield themselves. Waiting to impose penalties
may diminish their efficacy. Countries may accumulate foreign reserves
to finance post-default trade, rather than use income to pay debts.
Trading partners that gain from trade with debtors may help to facilitate
transactions; it is hard to know what potential institutions will try to
substitute for banks, thereby undermining the sanctions available to
banks.
Gersovitz (1983) develops a model in which the penalty associated
with default depends positively on the importance to a debtor of its
opportunity to trade. An implication is that a borrower's commitment to
increase investment raises the credit ceiling if it increases the value
of the option to trade. In the factor endowment model this is not always
the case. If the investment is in_import—competing industries, then the
country may be better able to withstand a credit embá'rgo. If the
investment is in export industries, requiring at the same time large
imports of certain key materials, then the country may be in a much worse
position t withstand a credit embargo.
Inseries of papers Sachs (1984) and Cooper and Sachs (1985),
Sachs and Cohen (1985) assume that the penalty is proportional to income.
This assumption is useful in illustrating certain basic aspects of
creditor-debtor relationships, as is the model of-subsection 11.1, but
the penalty is clearly not a plausible one in the same way as an exclu-
sion from future borrowing or trade transactions. As a consequence, some
of their conclusions seem questionable, such as their emphasis on the
benefits obtained by a credit-constrained borrower who can precommit to
investment rather than consumption; see Gersovitz (1985).4
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III. The Resolve of Lenders
So far, we have assumed that lenders always penalize debtors who do
not adhere to loan agreements. But will lenders do so? There is no
obvious way that lenders can commit themselves at the time the loan is
made to punish a country that refuses to pay. Depending on the
situation, it may be costly to penalize recalcitrant debtors. Moreover,
punishment may not affect the prospect of a resumption of debt service.
If it is not in the interest of lenders to punish, then the threat of
punishment will not be credible to borrowers. An equilibrium with
positive lending will be infeasible.
In some cases the penalties may be fairly automatic. For instance,
if a country that refuses to pay banks tries to transact with the help
of these same banks, itmay find that its transactions balances are
offset by the banks against its outtanding obligations. The country
will then have to seek alternative means of effecting transactions,
presumably at higher cost, to avoid this threat. In fact, a promise by
the banks not to seize the country's balance may itself not be credible.
This mechanism is part of the justification behind the trade-cost model
in Gersovitz (1983).
There is more doubt, however, about the resolve of lenders to
exclude debtors from future loans. Below, we discuss two models. In
one, lenders do cut off credit from those who are in default (as part of a
reputational equilibrium), but in the other they do not, and the loan
market ceases to function.19
111.1. Penalties in Reputation-Based Models
Contracts that are unenforceable through the legal system may still
be enforced by some kind of reputational mechanism. The threat of losing
one's reputation (credit rating) is what induces so-called good behavior
(repayment of the loan). There are two classes of reputational models.
In one there are markets in which there are inherently good and bad
borrowers. Lenders make an inference concerning individuals according to
their past behavior. Thus it is the fear of being classified as a bad
borrower that induces good behavior. But even if there is only one type
of borrower, reputational mechanisms may be effective. To construct a
reputational equilibrium one must show that, if a borrower does not
service a loan, it will not pay the lender (or any other lender) to
extend credit to him. Thus reputational models entail the simultaneous
analysis of borrower and lender behavior.
-
InEaton and Gersovitz (1981a), lenders are competitive, and each
occupies a small share of the market, earning zero profit on any loan.
It therefore costs the lender nothing to refrain from future lending.
Moreover, in their model, the borrowers and lenders interact over a
potentially infinite horizon. [In a finite horizon, a loss of reputation
means nothing in the last period, and therefore cannot justify any
last-period lending. By backward induction, reputation is meaningless,
as in the chain-store paradox discussed by Selten (1978).]
If there is no finite upper bound on the number of times players
expect to play a game, however, and their identity is remembered by their
opponents, then the players! reputation as cooperative players can
succeed in enforcing some degree of cooperation. A player who fails to20
cooperate at any single play will not find cooperative partnersfor
subsequent plays. If players' discount rates are zerothen full coopera-
tion is ensured, while infinite discount rates leads to no cooperation.
With a finite but positive discount rate, some co-operation emerges,and
in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) this is embodied in the credit ceiling
that sets the maximum loan that lenders will extend to countriesthat
have paid in the past.
For the threat of withdrawal of credit to be a credible sanction,it
must not only be in the interests of the current creditors towithdraw
credit, but it also must be in the interests of potentialcreditors not
to extend credit. The relatively small number of internationalbanks may
be able to sustain the cooperative outcome (in which they all punish
defaulters) within a non-cooperative context. Since they deal witheach
other repeatedly, those who fail to cooperate will themselves be pun-
ished. Moreover, the country's current bankers are likely to be more
informed concerning the country than other potential lenders. Hence,the
refusal of the current lenders to continue extending credit maylead
others to refuse as well; see Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984).
Indeed, the current lender usually has more to gain fromthe continuation
of credit than do others, for it stands to recover earlier loans aswell.
Finally, seniority clauses in international loan contractscould be
enforced by earlier lenders against subsequent lenders in the courts
of developed countries, thereby dissuading other potential lenders.
Such clauses are attractive because they do not require a suit or
enforcement of a judgement against the sovereign debtor. Stiglitzand
Weiss (1983) show that if there are seniority provisions inoutstanding
loans, then if the current lender refused to lend,others will as well.21
Because individuals are finite lived, they may lack incentives to
impose penalties, so lending among individuals may not be sustainable.
Infinitely-lived institutions, such as banks, can emerge, however, that
can credibly threaten to punish debtors in order to maintain their
reputation as lenders. Maintaining the value of their equity investments
in a bank provides the incentive to the owners of the bank to punish
default. The failure to do so would cause the value of a bank's equity
to fall to zero.
For this mechanism to work, the value of bank equity must exceed the
cost of imposing the penalty. If it is costly to punish, a bank must
earn a profit strictly in excess of zero. The interest rate on loans
consequently exceeds that on deposits. Even though in equilibrium the
penalty is never imposed, the cost of implementing the penalty causes the
equilibrium allocation to differ from what would emerge if loan repayment
were automatic, see Eaton (1985).
-
111.2Information and the Lender's Problem
Lenders need information to make sure that they can prevent the
debtor from getting into situations in which debt is not serviced. In
subsection 11.2, we discussed a model in which debtors did not pay in
some states of nature, but debtors and lenders had the same information
about the likelihood of these states of nature. Borrowers may, however,
have more information than lenders about their own attributes that
determine their susceptibility to penalties, and even about the total
amount of debt they have undertaken which, with the penalty, determines
the set of states when the borrower does not pay as he contracted.22
Kletzer (1984) analyzessomeof the problems that arise under these
circumstances in a model similar to that of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a).
He focuses on knowledge about the amount lent, a crucial determinant of
borrower behavior. (See also Arnott and Stiglitz, (1983) for the basic
structure of such moral hazard problems).
If lenders can observe the total quantity lent, competition will
assure a loan-interest-rate combination that maximizes borrower utility
subject to the zero-profit condition. The equilibrium is consequently
determined by a tangency of a borrower's indifference curve to the supply
curve. The borrower will be constrained in that, given the interest
rate, he would prefer to borrow more.
On the other hand, the total amount lent may be unobserved by
lenders. If an equilibrium with positive debt exists under these circum-
stances, it will be characterized by both a higher debt and a higher
interest rate than if debt is observable. The borrower .is better off
when debt is observable, however; the lower rate of interest morethan
compensates for the rationing of credit. Kletzer interprets lending
through syndicates and the importance of short-term debt as institutional
arrangements in international financial markets that facilitate lenders'
monitoring and control of the borrower's total debt.
As we noted in section II, borrowers may be able to take actions
that affect penalties, and thereby undermine their willingness to pay.
To the extent that these actions are observable, and lenders can deter
them by credibly threatening sanctions, no moral hazard problems arise..
But when the action is unobservable, moral hazard problems are a concern
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and 1983). Furthermore, if different borrowers
have different unobservable susceptibilities to penalties, creditors will23
have an incentive to design contracts that improve the quality of their
borrowers, or that sort borrowers. As a result market equilibria may be
characterized by credit rationing and/or a nonlinear relationship between
interest payments and loan size; see Jaffee and Russell (1976) and
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 and 1983). For instance, In the context of
international loans, whether debtors are prepared to adopt an IMFprogram
or not may serve to distinguish between countries that do and do not
intend to service their debts.
111.3 The Breakdown of Lending
So far, we have looked at models in which lenders may manage to deal
with problems of asynmietric information and credibility, at least
sufficiently to justify some lending. Hellwig (1977) provides a model
that stresses the inability of lenders to cope with enforcement problems,
and their consequent inability to lend. -
Inthis model, the breakdown of lending results from the lender's
inability to precommit himself to a ceiliiig on indebtedness. The borrow-
er is an agent with zero current income. At some unknown future date the
borrower's income is expected to jump to a permanently higher level. If
by that time the borrower has not defaulted then any debt up to some
maximum is repaid. In the meantime, the borrower finances his consump-
tion from loans. The lender extends a line of credit which the borrower
draws down as he consumes. If the line is depleted before income rises,
the loan goes into default unless more credit is forthcoming. If default
occurs, the borrower's utility from that moment onward is specified
exogenously as a decreasing. function of indebtedness.24
A particular consumption profile corresponds to each amount of total.
credit that the borrower believes available. The lender wants the
borrower to draw on credit slowly, minimizing the probability of default
before income rises. If the lender could precommit to providing a
particular amount of credit then a loan to the borrower can provide a
non-negative expected yield. The problem is that if the borrower ex-
hausts the initial line of credit before his income rises, the lender has
an incentive to provide more. Cutting the borrower off ensures default;
extending credit maintains a hope of repayment. Part of the return on
additional funds committed to the borrower is the possibility of salvag-
ing some of what has already been lent. The lender will consequently
make loans that would not yield a profitable expected return on their
own. It pays him at that point to throw good money afterbad.8
The borrower perceives that when he exhausts the initial loan the
lender will provide more. He consequently draws down the initial loan
more quickly. This raises the probability of his incurring the maximum
amount of debt that will be repaid before, income rises, at which point
credit is cut off.
By initially extending credit, then, the lender places himself in a
situation in which the commitment of additional funds may be profitable
even though the expected return on all funds committed is negative. To
avoid this imbroglio he desists from lending in the first place. He
suffers from his inability to control the borrower's consumption once the
loan has been made, and from his inability to control his own future
lending behavior. While some features of Hellwig's model may seem
special, the point raised is more general as shown by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981).25
111.4.Panics by Lenders
The previous section explained why enforcement and commitment
problems may constrain lending in some circumstances, even though
additional lending r.y be mutually beneficial in the absence of these
problems. We now examine situations in which banks that have been
lending suddenly cut off credit. There is some similarity between such
credit runs and the traditional problem of bank runs.
While bank runs have long been a source of concern, only recently
have researchers developed simple models to analyze them; see Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and Nakamura (1985). Diamond and Dybvig analyze runs using
game theory. All lenders are better off if none withdraws his funds.
But if some depositors run, the others are better off if they
simultaneously withdraw their funds, or, indeed, anticipate the others'
action and withdraw first. There exist perfect equilibria in which all
try to withdraw and others in which none do.
Nakamura observes that the expected rate of return on deposits is a
function of the number of depositors withdrawing their funds; while at
the same time, the number of depositors withdrawing their funds is a
function of the expected rate of return. There may be multiple solutions
to this pair of equations, in one of which many depositors withdraw funds
(a run), and in the other of which few do. The existence of multiple
equilibria raises questions about which equilibrium prevails, and why and
how the economy moves among them.
Depositors are, of course, the bank's creditors; the phenomenon of
runs can arise whenever a borrower has many creditors and there are
short-term liabilities. Each creditor wishes to protect himself; in26
doing so, he may actually increase thelikelihood that others will be
unable to recoup what they have lent. This is a potentially important
externality.
The occurrence of runs depends critically on the form ofthe debt
instrument. For instance, in the Diamond-Dybvig model,the bank must
allow any customer to withdraw his entire deposit at the posted yield on
a first-come-first-served basis. Other contract arrangementsavoid this
problem; for instance, if there is a well-defined senioritystructure,
runs will not occur. Runs do not occur againstmutual funds, since the
asset value is continuously redefined. To the extent thatthe runs
problem is important, one needs to explain why acontractual form that
leads to runs is employed.
Sachs (1984) and Krugman (1985) present models similar toDiamond
and Dybvig with respect to syndicated bank loans to developing countries,
only with the borrowing country assuming the role ofthe banks and the
lending banks that of the individual depositors. In period one th,e
borrower owes debt to a large number of bank lenders, an amountthat
exceeds current income.
The central problem in explaining credit runs is why it does not pay
other banks to step in when one lender withdraws credit. Sachsresolves
this difficulty by assuming that each bank faces a rising marginalcost
of loans, an assumption that can be justified by bank exposure
regulations or by managerial risk aversion. Becauseindividual banks
face an increasing marginal cost of lending, it may not pay any single
bank to extend a loan to avoid a default in the first period.It is in
the collective interest of all creditors to extend furthercredit in
concert, guaranteeing themselves the necessary return.-The reason for27
this in Sachs' model is that a failure to renew any loan in thefirst
period brings about a situation in which no loan is repaid in either
period. ?lore generally, this will be true if the return on one loan
increases with the amount lent by others. This hypothesis can be
contrasted with that of Kletzer (and moral hazard analysis, in general)
where the return on one loan decreases with the amount lent by others.
The assumption of an increasing marginal cost to each bank of
lending may be questioned. The senior debtor knows that if he refuses to
renew credit others will do so as well; see also Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981). Even if the cost of capital increases with exposure, once some
amounthasbeen extended, a bank may be willing to commit further funds
to prevent the loss of the original commitment even if, standing alone,
the yield would be inadequate. Consequeutly, it is a bank with an
initially large exposure that will find the value of extending further
credit the greatest.
The criticisms levied earlier at the Diamond-Dybvig model app'y here
as well. In particular, to the extent that this is a serious problem,it
should have been anticipated. To the extent that it was anticipated, the
problem could have been forestalled, e.g. by each bank lending for two
periods, and only on the condition that other banks lent for asimilar
period. There is, moreover, one important difference betweenbank
behavior and the behavior of depositors. Because banks are engaged in
economic relations with each other repeatedly over an extended periodof
time, there may exist a cooperative equilibrium thatsustains the effi-
cient outcome (no-runs).
As Gersovitz (1985) has pointed out, there is a basic difference
between a situation in which the debtor would like to obtain a new net28
flow of funds and one in which he merely wants to postpone debt service.
It is the latter situation that most debtors have confronted who have
recently engaged in reschedulings. They are making net payments to their
creditors, but less than would be required by the original loan contracts
in the absence of new loans. In this case, the debtor can deal with
reluctant creditors by declaring a unilateral, partial moratorium on debt
service. If all creditors have the same upward-sloping cost of funds,
the debtor will minimize their losses by making proportional (although
partial) payments. By contrast, the upward-sloping cost of funds and the
associated externality means that it may not be possible for the debtor
first to pay all creditors and then to ask them for further funds. It is
this difference between a pro-rated moratorium or rescheduling and a
refinancing after payment that the Sachs and Krugman models explain. On
this interpretation current problems are more ones of form than sub-
stance, assuming, of course, that there is no fundamental reason, such as
willingness-to-pay, why debt service will not be resumed.
It would be quite another thing if debtors needed positive flows.
For instance, a debtor may have an investment project already underway
that will become valueless without a further infusion of funds to allow
its completion. In this case, the debtor could not unilaterally initiate
a solution and the prospects for success under the Sachs and Krugman
assumptions would be very much reduced. The problem would then be closer
to that originally postulated by Diamond and Dybvig who assume that
two-period investments are inherently more productive.29
IV. A Re—Examination of the Solvency Issue
Earlier, we remarked that it seems implausible that lending to
developing countries is constrained by their ability to pay, or solvency.
Debt levels do not seem so high, and, we argue, for a good reason: Long
before a countryts ability-to-pay would become relevant, its
willingness-to-pay constrains its access to credit.
An earlier literature did analyze the sovereign debt problems from a
solvency viewpoint, however, and in this section we briefly re-examine
this literature using the framework we have just presented. Although
primary reliance on ability-to-pay models is dangerous, some important
insights can be gained from this approach. Indeed, as noted, some of the
models of lenderst resolve we reviewed use solvency concepts in determin-
ing when payment occurs.
A useful way of understanding the problems that arise in evaluating
the ability of the borrower to repay a loan is to look at the basic
balance of trade identities. If D is total debt, D repayment of debt, r
the interest rate, and B the trade balance then in any period
(8) tD-rDEB.
If S is private savings, I domestic investment, T tax revenue and G
government spending, another identity is that
(9) D(S—I)+(T—G).
Thus debt service is related both to the trade surplus and to private and
government savings. If domestic product Y is independent of T, an
unconstrained government could in theory set TY, and IO, in which30
case S0 and óD+rDY. Though eqs. (8) and (9) are nothing wore-than
identities, they provide a framework for understanding possible sources
of problems in a country's meeting its foreign debt obligations.
An early paper by Domar (1950) made the point that a lender country
could perpetually run a current account surplus only if the growth rate
of loanable funds permanently exceeded the interest rate. Avramovic
(1964) applies an analysis somewhat like Domar's to a borrowing country.
There are fixed savings, tax and import parameters. In this context a
borrower eventually cannot repay his debt unless his growth rate perma-
nently exceeds the interest rate.
Such models suffer from two problems. First, the variables that
they take as exogenous, such as the growth rate, are endogenous. Second,
if they were exogenous, a variety of conundrums would arise. If the
borrower's growth rate remains permanently above the interest rate, there
would be the problem of matching loanable funds to the -implied loan
demand. On the other hand, how is repayment to occur if and when the
growth falls below the interest rate?
Since sovereign loans are owed by the governments of countries,
repayment is not constrained by the net worth of the country, but by that
component of net worth that the government can (or is willing to) appro-
priate. For a government that can impose lump-sum taxation at no admin-
istrative cost, national wealth and maximal government revenue do
coincide. Taxes typically impose excess burdens and are costly to raise,
however, so that the maximal amount that the government can extract from
an economy falls short of the net worth of the economy. Nonetheless, it
seems implausible that governments are anywhere near making the maximum
feasible debt service.31
Kharas (1984) and Sachs (1984) model solvency in terms of a con-
straint on government revenue. The first is a variant of the Domar
(1944) and Avramovic (1964) models with an exogenous, fixed proportional
tax rate, as well as an exogenous saving rate. Sachs (1983) considers a
two-period optimizing framework in which a government faces a revenue
constraint only in the repayment period. He emphasizes that such a
government should borrow less than the amount that equates the world
interest rate to the domestic marginal product of capital. The reason is
that the binding resource constraint implies a higher marginal cost of
government revenue in the repayment period than in the borrowing period.
The argument that a binding government budget constraint reduces
optimal borrowing does not, however, generalize much beyond this example.
If the government were, constrained in total resources from domestic
sources in the initial, rather than the repayment, period then the
marginal cost of funds in that period would exceed that' in the repayment
period. Efficiency would demand borrowing more than the amount thlt, .
invested,would equate the domestic marginal product of capital to the
world interest rate. The argument also assumes that the revenue from
investments financed by the loan does not accrue to the government, but
must be taxed from the private sector. Otherwise the standard condition
for optimality would apply.
More generally, there is not a rigid constraint on raising taxes in
any period. Efficient borrowing-cum-tax policy will take into account
three factors: (1) the marginal (social) cost of raising revenue in-
creases with the amount raised in any period; (2) additional investment
at one date may affect the marginal cost of raising funds at a later
date; and (3) borrowing costs may increase as a country borrows more32
within any period. Plausible models may be constructed thatimply a
countryshould borrow more than the amountthatwould, if invested,
equate the domestic marginal product of capital to the world interest
rate.
A second reason why national net worth may overstate resources
available for repayment to lenders abroad is the difficulty in
transferring national assets to foreigners. Simonsen (1985) provides an
extreme version of this view which postulates an autonomous trade
balance. A country's net worth, from a lender's perspective, is
consequently the discounted present value of its trade account. For a
solvent borrower this amount exceeds the value of debt. The value of
resources within the country is irrelevant since there is no way to
transfer them to foreigners except through the trade account. A less
extreme version of this view models the trade account as a function of a
set of variables that are partially responsive to policy. Repayment then
requires that the government pursue policies that yield the necessry
trade account surplus. This view precludes the possibility of repayment
by a direct sale of domestic assets to foreigners without their contempo-
raneous export.
One argument why the trade balance constrains a debtor's ability to
repay is the traditional transfer problem, an issue raised by
Diaz-Alejandro (1984). Repayment could worsen the terms of trade of a
debtor, consequently reducing his capacity to service debt. But the
transfer of purchasing power (as represented by the repayment of loans)-
from a small debtor to a larger creditor probably will not have a signif-
9
icantly adverse effect on the terms of trade.33
These solvency models emphasize how borrowers can come up against a
net-worth constraint and become unable to pay. A more complete picture
is given by other models that incorporate the behavior of lenders, who
only lend if there is a reasonable probability that this situation can be
prevented. In these models credit crises never arise since no bank lends
more than the borrower can repay. If repayment capacity is stochastic
the bank will in general lend so much that in some contingencies
repayment is impossible, at least without rescheduling (recall section
11.2).
Jaffee and Hodigliani (1969) present a model of a borrower with
limited resources next period to repay a loan. They make the point that
if the resources available to repay a loan are limited, then there is
cle4rly an upper bound on the amount that a lender will be willing to
lend.
The models of solvency that we have discussed up to this point have
treated the value of the borrower's resources available for repaymentas
an exogenous variable, and have assumed that borrowers and lenders share
the same subjective probability distribution about that value. In fact,
borrowers are more likely to have better information about their worth in
the repayment period than lenders, and borrowers' actions affect what
that distribution will be. Consequently lenders face problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard.
The terms of the contract affect both the mix of applicants and the
actions undertaken by those who get loans. Thus, increasing the rate of
interest may actually lower the bank's expected return, both because the
best risks (from the lender's perspective) decide not to apply and
because the higher interest charges induce borrowers to undertake greater34
risks. The consequence of this is that banks may find it profitable to
charge an interest rate below the market clearing level. This results in
credit rationing; see Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) also show how a bank involved repeatedly
in lending to a particular borrower can use the terms of subsequent loans
to modify the selection of borrowers or decisions of borrowers to its own
advantage. They assume that the bank can credibly commit itself to the
terms of subsequent loans when the initial loan is extended. In particu-
lar they show that a bank may exclude a borrower in default from subse-
quent loans to discourage (ex ante) riskyinvestinents.° They also have
analyzed the role of collateral, showing that its absence exacerbates
problems, although credit rationing may still exist with collateral.
Thus credit rationing may be more important in country loans, where
collateral is not feasible, than in domestic loans.
The Modigliani-Jaffee and Stiglitz-Weiss papers show how credit
rationing can arise when the borrower's insolvency threatens a loan. An
implication of the Stiglitz and Weiss papers is that solvency itself
cannot be defined independently of the actions of borrowers and lenders.
Even though, ex post, the lender receives all the borrowerts assets if a
default occurs, the borrower can affect the probability of being able to
pay. Ex ante the lender's return is affected by the borrower's actions.
Even when the solvency constraint is binding ex post, the borrower's
willingness-to-pay is important in this ex ante sense.
V. Operationalizing and Testing the Theories
Economists have investigated a fairly large number of theoretical
notions in their discussion of international lending. While many of the35
models complement each other, we have remarked upon important conceptual
differences among them. In this section and the next, we are motivated
by a set of very general questions about the empirical relevance of these
models: How can these theories help to interpret recent developments in
international lending? How can they be used to identify future topic" of
importance and to make predictions? How can experience in the markets be
used to distinguish which theories are relevant? What are the priorities
for further theoretical research? In short, what are the connections
between the theories, empirical research and what is happening in these
markets?
Specific empirical questions facing the researcher range from
knowing the facts to understanding the actual behavior of borrowers and
lenders. Some examples are: How much has been lent and what determines
the amount lenders wish to lend, borrowers wish to borrow, and the actual
amount of debt outstanding? What are the terms of the-loans, and what
determines them? What typesofruptures occur between lenders and
borrowers, and why? Do lenders maintain unity in confrontations with
debtors, and under what circumstances? What are the terms of the
reschedulings? of HIP agreements?
Some of these questions are informational, and knowledge of particu-
lar facts can answer them. No econometric analysis is needed. Others
involve evidence on the motivations of borrowers and lenders, and involve
inferences about behavior. In principle, econometric analysis is appro-
priate; in practice, there are limitations to the application of
-
econometricmethods. One obstacle to econometric work arises because the
informational questions are logically prior to econometric analysis, and36
when they cannot be answered in a satisfactory manner, there may be
little point to pressing on with econometric analysis.
One basic problem confronting all econometric studies of sovereign
debt is that the unit of analysis is unavoidably the country. Conse-
quently, it is very difficult to identify exogeneous variables that vary
by the unit of analysis. The interpretation of many results in the
literature is clouded by the inclusion in the estimated relationships of
many endogenous variables as explanatory variables. The terms of trade,
however, is one important source of external shocks that may be roughly
exogenous for many developing countries, which tend to be relatively
small in world markets. Similarly, it may be possible to. introduce
climatological variables to measure an important set of domestic shocks
when agriculture is an important source of income, exports and government
revenues.
Existing studies fall into two groups corresponding.to an earlier
and a later stage in the relationship between borrowers and lenders. One
group focuses on an environment of voluntary lending, and seeks to
identify the determinants of the quantity of debt, and the terms at which
it is contracted. The second type of study focuses on when debt problems
arise. So far there are no studies that address the prospects for a
resumption of voluntary lending to countries that have experienced
problems.
Estimating the determinants of debt outstanding is quite difficult.
Even in the absence of problem cases, it is necessary to allow for the
possibility that observed debt is the minimum of the credit ceiling and
desired debt. This implies two regimes. An appropriate econometric
technique produces not only coefficient values but also a probabilistic37
separation of the sample into the two regimes. The existence of problem
debtors whose debt exceeds the level desired by creditors means that
three or more regimes are required in empirical work if both cases of
voluntary and involuntary lending are to be treated in a unified
analysis.
At present, only the two-regime model has been estimated (Eaton and
Gersovitz 1980, 1981a). In these studies the observations on individual
countries were from 1970 and 1974, so that there was no need to account
for problem debtors. By the same token, however, these results apply to
only a very early period in the evolution of lending to developing
countries. Bank lending was much less important before 1973-74. The
results of these studies indicate that two regimes rather than only one
are justified; the credit-constrained regime was relatively more
prevalent.11 In 1974 relatively more countries were credit-constrained.
Some of the oil exporters that were included in the sample for both years
moved against this trend, however, as one would expect. The analysis of
Eaton and Gersovitz (1980), which considers determinants of foreign
reserve holdings as well as international indebtedness, suggests that
debt was a substitute for reserves.
In the analysis of debt levels and debt problems, an important
distinction is between the long-run characteristics of countries (for
instance, the standard deviation of the terms of trade about trend) and
transitory shocks that they may experience (the actual deviation of the
terms of trade from trend in any one year). For instance, Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981a) present a model in which an increase in the permanent
variability of a debtor's income can increase the debt ceiling it faces,
although a failure to repay, if it occurs at all, will occur in a period38
of relatively low income: Existing studies use some constructed measures
for long-run country characteristics such as the variability of exports.
They do not, however, incorporate variables capturing transitory factors
into the estimation. Under reasonable distributional assumptions, the
omission of these variables (and their implicit inclusion in the error
term) need not bias the estimated coefficients. Of course, their omis-
sion does mean that these models do not reflect the role of shocks in
determining indebtedness.
Gersovitz (1985) presents graphical evidence that debt has tended to
increase most markedly when the terms of trade would seem to have been
temporarily high. Thus, debt does not seem to have helped countries to
smooth their absorption, despite the theoretical presumption that debtors
would want this pattern, and that creditors should want to accomodate
them to the extent that debt is below the borrower's credit ceiling. It
may be that when shock variables are included in the formaleconometric
work, this casual impression will be reversed. If it is not, howeter, it
may be possible to determine whether this pattern reflectsbehavior of
leaders, borrowers, or both groups.
Finally, there is scope for improving these models by using data
available since the earlier studies and variables that could be con-
structed from unpublished data sources. The Eaton-Gersovitz studies use
the World Bank's World Debt Tables series on debt to private creditors.
It is important to add short-term debt guaranteed by the debtor country
to the World Bank figures to produce a dependent variable that is more
comprehensive. Cline (1984, pp. 291-2) discusses one way this can be
done. It would also be useful to integrate debt owed by the private
sector that is not guaranteed by the debtor's government. This leads to39
questions of model specification as well as of data because such debt is
subject to sovereign risk in rather special ways, as well as subject to
conventional risks of corporate failure. At the same time, a significant
part of debt owed to private creditors is guaranteed by the governments
of these creditors, and these debts must be treated more like debt to
public creditors.
Bank loans to sovereign borrowers typically specify an interest rate
that is the suni of two components, a reference rate from an OECD finan-
cial market, usually the London Inter Bank Offer Rate, and a spread. The
reference rate component is adjusted at fixed intervals to its current
market value, so that the loans are at floating rates. The spread is set
for the duration of the loan, and is the component specific to the loan.
There are several, econometric investigations of these spreads.
McDonald (1982) provides references and some description of individual
studies. These studies focus on an interpretation of the spread as a
risk premium, and attempt to infer the lenders' perception of los from
the size of the spread. The type of loan problem leading to the spread
is not, however, explicitly specified, nor could it be, given the method-
ology and information. Insofar as a probability of loss is inferred, it
seems to correspond to a probability (7z)oftotal loss of present value,
via the condition (1—n)(1+r+s)(1+r) where r is the safe, base rate and s
is the spread.
In fact, however, the spreads may reflect other factors. There may
be higher costs of originating loans in certain countries. Tax treatment
of interest income earned by foreigners in the borrowing countries may
have implications for spreads. For instance, in Mexico, the Mexican
withholding tax may be paid by the borrower but still-generates U.S. tax40
credits for the lender. Other components of the loan contract, such as
the front-end fees, affect the total return to the lender.
In general, these studies use an eclectic list of explanatory
variables that are not derived from a clearly stated model of sovereign
lending and borrowing. Because they share this characteristic with
models of debt problems, we postpone a discussion of individual
variables.
One problem that is specific to these models, however, is the
inclusion of other conditions of the loan agreement as explanatory
variables, and these are most probably endogenous. The motivation for
their inclusion is that these factors are known to be related to interest
rates even in markets without a risk of repayment. For instance, there
is a term structure relationship between rate and maturity on U.S.
government bonds. On the other hand, such loan characteristics can play
a special role in the context of sovereign lending. For instance, we
have already noted that loans of short maturity allow for more frequent
and effective monitoring of the sovereign, debtor, the so-called short
leash. On the other hand, very short-term debt is often poorly recorded
and it is often feared that debtors who anticipate debt problems and
credit constraints may surreptitously run up their short-term
indebtedness, the problem modeled by Kletzer (1984). Thus these
econometric studies have included explanatory variables that are
themselves endogenously determined by lenders and borrowers with
reference to considerations of sovereign risk.
By far the largest number of econometric studies of sovereign
lending attempt to explain instances of so-called problem debtors.
tlcDonald (1982) and Saini and Bates (1984) provide extensive surveys of41
variablea used, estimation methods, coefficient estimates and success in
predicting the events studied. Edwards (1984) and McFadden et al (1985)
are recent studies in this tradition.
All these investigations try to understand the determinants shifting
a country from being a good to a bad borrower. The fundamental difficul-
ty with these models is defining appropriately the dependent variable,
the occurence of a debt problem. The earliest study, Frank and Cline
(1971), asked when multilateral reschedulings of debt owed to official
creditors occur in Paris-Club type arrangements. This type of question
is well posed, and has some obvious policy interest. But it is not the
question that seems central to the current debate over sovereign lending;
namely, will banks regret having made loans to developing countries?
None of the observable events (arrears, reschedulings, or IMF programs)
that these econometric studies analyze answer this question. Within the
group of countries experiencing each of these events are presumably good
credit risks and bad. It is just not possible to say based on an event
analysis what the prospects for ultimately realizing the present value of
loans are. Even in the case of an explicit repudiation, the rupture
between debtors and creditors is never irrevocable. Furthermore, even in
very bad situations from the banks' viewpoint, there may be reason for
the banks to avoid calling a default and for the country to demur from an
explicit repudiation. Such actions may trigger intervention by bank
regulators that is unwelcome to creditors, and consequently to debtors.
Debt problems are therefore hard to define. We have come full circle to
our opening comments about the difficulties of ascertaining loan status
inherent in situations in which the relationship between debtors and
creditors potentially stretches over an indefinite future.42
As an alternative to the study of such events as arrears,
reschedulings or IMP problems with their hazy implications for market
participants, it is probably better to focus on flows of funds between
creditors and debtors. In other words, the critical question is: When
will a country with certain characteristics owing a certain amount of
debt under certain contractual arrangements pay or receive funds from
creditors with certain characteristics? One could then, in principle,
make an estimate of the present value that creditors will realize on
their original loan, as well as whether countries can expect to receive
more funds. This strategy means a return to the estimation of debt
supply and demand equations, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1980, 1981a) but
with potentially more regimes. McFadden et al. (1985) introduce a
multi-regime model of sovereign debt, but it focuses on arrears and
reschedulings, and therefore analyzes events rather than the flow of
funds.
Another shortcoming of these econometric models is their incorpora-
tion of many variables on a rather ad hoc basis (see Eaton and Gersovitz,
1981b for a further discussion). For instance, some studies have used
the ratio of capital inflow to debt service, a variable that is likely to
be simultaneous with default. Others use variables like the inflation
rate with little obvious theoretical justification. If the notion is
that a government short of revenue will resort to the inflation tax as
well as run arrears, then the variables are endogenous.
While econometric analysis of international lending faces severe
difficulties, there are other types of empirical approaches that have
been tried in an attempt to forecast the prospects of debtors and credi-
tors. Kaletsky (1985) reviews the prospects for sanctions of various43
types andtheir Costs to debtors. This type of analysis is potentially
prescriptive; it provides the type of information that banks and debtors
may use in making decisions. By contrast, the econometric analysis
assumes that the participants know what they should do, and are doing it.
Asecond type of exercise used to determine repayment prospects is
represented by Cline's (1984) projection ofexports, imports and other
balance of payments entries. He argues that if the credit entries grow
relative to the debit entries excluding debt service, the prospects for
debt service are enhanced. This approach neglects that the magnitudes of
all these variables are jointly determined. A country may decide that
its creditors will neither extend it new funds nor be aJle to deploy
effective sanctions. It can then choose to increase its imports or
reserves or decrease its exports relative to the levels projected by
reference to past trends and OECD variables.
VI. Conclusions
The rash of debt reschedulings led to a widespread view that banks
had lent too much. Though bankers may now regret having made some of
these loans, the relevant question is whether there was some market
failure leading to inappropriate lending behavior. We have already noted
that the unenforceability of contracts can imply that credit is rationed,
and that lending is probably too low relative to what would be optimal if
contracts were enforceable, and that borrowers would prefer this latter
situation. Now we turn to a related set of questions: (1) Are there
factors motivating bankers to lend more than what is likely to be repaid?
(2) What is the role of bank regulation in this context? and (3) What is
the interpretation of rescheduling?44
These questions are inherently very difficult to answer because
there is a one-shot aspect about the debt situation. The players do not
make repetitive choices in similar situations. There is the comparative
behavior of many countries, but they all borrow from more or less the
same group of banks. Analysts can refer, therefore, to only a rather
limited experience.
VI.1 Potential Inefficiencies in International Lending
One potentially important inefficiency results when lenders cannot
observe the magnitude of outstanding loans. In this case, the lending of
an additional dollar has an externality since it increases the likelihood
of default. As Kletzer (1984) shows, this factor can increase the amount
lent and the probability of default, as well as the initial interest
rate. This type of problem may be more relevant to international lending
than domestic lending to individual firms. In sovereign lending, senior-
ity clauses are less important, and a number of lenders make loans to a
multitude of government ministries, agencies and public enterprises.
There is another informational externality of potential importance:
The fact that one lender is willing to lend funds conveys information
about the creditworthiness of the borrower. Similarly, the refusal of a
bank to lend funds conveys information to other suppliers of capital.
This externality may contribute to the occurrence of runs. In our
earlier discussion, we noted that one might view a lending crisis as a
run. Each creditor wishes to protect himself; in doing so, he may
actually increase the likelihood that others will be unable to recoup
what they have lent.45
It is not only that theforcedliquidation of assets consequent upon
an unexpected withdrawal of credit has a deleterious effect on the net
worth of the borrower. The withdrawal of credit by some creditors
induces a revision in others' estimates of the likelihood of a default,
and this by itself can lead to a run.
Lenders must make inferences about the likelihood of a default on
the basis of partial information. Some of the risks facing one borrower
are similar to those facing another borrower. Withdrawal of credit
against one borrower may even cause a re-evaluation of credit extended to
other similarly situated borrowers. Thus, there are informational
externalities extending across borrowers as well as across lenders. But
in general, our conclusion is that if a runs externality were the sole
cause of debt problems., it can be handled by a lender-initiated
moratorium since new funds net of interest payments do not seem to be
required.
Banks are limited liability institutions. Thus, when a bank pnder-
takes a risk, it may be imposing some costs on its creditors which it
does not fully take into account, just as firms or countries to which it
lent money did not fully take into account the costs that their actions
had on the bank.
Nany governments of developed countries insure deposits by their
citizens in the banks that lend to developing countries. This insurance
obviates the need for depositors to supervise bank portfolios, a
presumably costly activity for small depositors that provides the
rationale for the insurance. In addition, there may be a role for
insurance in removing the incentive for bank panics, as discussed by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983).46
To ensure that this insurance does not lead to moral hazard on the
part of banks, various regulations have been adopted to circumscribe
their behavior. In the United States, loans to individual borrowers are
not to exceed a fraction of bank capital, but all loans to a single
country or even to all agencies of a single government were never
classified as being to an individual borrower, in this sense. This
provision has therefore not prevented the aggregate of loans to entities
in individual developing countries from becoming a significant fraction
of bank capital.
One important policy that regulators can take is to force banks to
increase their net worth. This is particularly important in a situation
of involuntary lending (rescheduled loans that otherwise would be in
default). Banks are induced to make these loans because they can pay
dividends based on interest income that is only paid to them because they
extend new loans. Unless these regulators prevent banks from paying
these dividends, their loans to developing countries will continuously
rise relative to their capital. This process will increase the
contingent claim on,theinsurance schemes, potentially without bound. In
fact, U.S. regulators have required two major banks to increase their
capital. There is really very little cost to extending this program
since it requires no judgment on the ultimate worth of the loans.
A related policy that regulators could adopt is to require full
disclosure of loans made to individual countries. Increased reporting
requirements have been promulgated by U.S. regulators. This information
can help uninsured depositors and shareholders to monitor the portfolio
decisions of bank managements and thereby to deter moral hazard.47
Insuranceagencies can also deter the undesirable risk-taking
consequences of insurance by adopting differentiated premia that increase
with the riskiness of loans and with their proportion in an individual
bank's portfolio. This has not been a general feature of insurance
programs, but would deter banks from undertaking correlated loans that
yield expected returns net of insurance payments below those on a safe
loan, but expected profits to the banks above those on a safe loan.
Similarly, the categorization of loans as requiring loss reserves can
also be further differentiated.
The moral hazard problems caused by deposit insurance are reinforced
by typjcal (implicit) managerial compensation schemes in which judgments
concerning performance are based on relative performance. This too may
lead to excessive correlation of risks undertaken across banks. Assume
most banks are undertaking higher yielding loans to LDC's. If all loans
go into default, then it is unlikely that all (or possibly any) bank
managers will be punished; each manager's judgment is confirmed by.the
actions of the others. On the other hand, if any one refuses to lend,
and there is no default, the lower return earned by the bank will count
against the manager. Thus, as emphasized elsewhere in the New Theory of
the Firm, one must take into account the incentives of the managers;
risks faced by the firm and risks faced by the manager are not
necessarily the same. It may be possible to deter moral hazard if
regulators directly penalize managers, as happened to some extent in the
Continental-Illinois case.48
VI.2 Interpreting the Reschedulings
In termsofthe models discussed so far, rescheduling has a number
of interpretations. One is simply that it is a device to extend the term
of the loans in question; rescheduling a short-term loan is simply
another means of issuing a long-term loan.
As we have noted, the option for certain types of unspecified
interventions that a short-term loan contract allows provides it with
certain advantages over long—term contracts. In particular, rescheduling
a short-term loan gives creditors more control over the borrower's
indebtedness. That is why short term loans may be employed, even when it
is (correctly) anticipated that there will be a high probability of a
rescheduling.
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Still other explanations are that rescheduling is an action by
creditors to bring a solvent, willing-to-pay debtor through a liquidity
crisis or that it is an attempt by an insolvent or unwilling-to-pay
borrower to postpone the inevitable sanctions it will suffer when
repayment ultimately is not made. Creditors go along in the latter
instance because they hope: (1) that the problem is really one of
liquidity; (2) that, by waiting, they may find other, more gullible
lenders or a public institution to assume the debt; or (3) that the
moment of public realization of the worthlessness of the loan can be
postponed until the bank personnel responsible for it have left.
Heliwig's (1977) model suggests another rationale, that rescheduling is
the lender's throwing of good money after bad to keep alive some prospect
of the debtor's repaying.49
In most cases, rescheduling reflects a failure to contract
completely against all possible contingencies.13 Ozier (1984) has
developed a model analyzing the consequences of this when, after the
initial loan, the two parties confront each other as bilateral
monopolists (even though initially the loan market is competitive). From
the perspective of the initial period two magnitudes are in doubt, the
borrower's income in the second period and the penalty of default. The
borrower is ultimately solvent, however. The initial loan is extended
for one period. Three outcomes are possible. First, the borrower's
income and the default penalty both exceed the repayment obligation; the
loan is repaid on schedule. Second, the borrower's income falls short of
the repayment obligations. A liquidity problem forces the borrower to
reschedule at terms moire favorable to the lenders than the initial loan,
since lenders are now monopolists vis-à-vis the borrower. Third, the
penalty of default falls below the borrower's debt service obligation.
The borrower uses the threat of nonpayment to negotiate a reschedu'ing of
the loan on terms more favorable to himself.
Two features of the model may have particular relevance to actual
lending in international capital markets. First, even though default
never actually occurs, borrowers can use the threat of default to extract
better loan terms. Kraft's (1984) description of Hexico's debt resched-
uling indicates that Mexican negotiators raised the specter of default
for exactly this purpose. Second, reschedulings may take place for
different reasons, with different implications for borrowers and lenders.
Ozier studies the effect of rescheduling announcements on the value of
the equity of banks involved. She finds that during the late 1970's
reschedulings typically raised equity, suggesting a liquidity50
explanation. The opposite is the case for the early 1980's, which she
interprets as reflecting a decline in the perceived cost of default to
the debtor. This view also seems consistent with the pattern of
interest-rate spreads on rescheduled loans, which were first higher and
then lower than those on so-called voluntary loans.
VI.3 Final Remarks
The central role played by the enforcement problem and the absence
of collateral make the international loan market fundamentally different
from domestic credit markets. In a sense, our analysis leads to a view
that it is perhaps more surprising that there has been as much lending to
developing countries as that there is not more. It is hard to interpret
events to ascertain the future course of payments by debtors to creditors
and by creditors to debtors. But we believe that our framework can help
to organize thinking about the topics raised by sovereign lending and
country risk, and to point up inconsistencies that could otherwise plague
analysis in this area.51
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ENDNOTES
Weonly use default in this restricted sense.
2 Consider a firmforwhich it has suddenly become apparent that there
is a large probability that output will be zero. The expected
present discounted value of its future income stream is less than
the value of its outstanding obligations. The firm is (by standard
definitions) insolvent. But a rational lender would not declare the
firm in default, if there were no moral hazard problem. For doing
so would simply waste away some of the value which the lender might
otherwise be able to appropriate.
Consider, by contrast, a similar firm for which a new investment
opportunity suddenly becomes available. The new investment is very
risky. The expected present discounted value of the firm is very
positive. If the firm undertakes the project, however, the expected
return of the bank will be substantially decreased. The bank only
obtains a return when the firm does not go bankrupt; it does not
share in the bonanza which accrues if the risky investment project
is successful. The bank would like to stop the project, but its
loan contract does not have any provision enabling it to do so. If,
however, there is a provision in the loan contract, which enables it
to declare the loan in default, it would be in the interests of the
lender to do so, even though the firm is not insolvent.57
3 We emphasize our dissatisfaction with models that simply take
critical parameters of the economy as exogenous and, by so doing,
create a problem.
4 Note that the losses to the borrower often exceed the gains to the
lender. This suggests that, at least in some circumstances, the
incentive effects of collateral are more important than its guaran-
tee effects.
5 There may, of course, be some exceptions such as the opportunity to
seize airplanes owned by a national airline in default that tries to
use them in international service.
6 For instance, Sachs and Cohen (1985) point out that the opportunity
not to pay may substitute for insurance, allowing a risk averse
borrower to offset bad shocks elsewhere. See also Eaton and
Gersovitz (1984) on penalties under uncertainty.
7 Kreps and Wilson (1982) suggest how imperfect information of a
particular kind can sustain a reputational equilibrium even in a
finite-horizon game.
8 Note that the current lender's incentives for extending credit are
thus greater than the incentives of other potential lenders (recall
our earlier discussion and Stiglitz-Weiss, 1983).
9 It is worth noting, however, that the initial extension of the loan
must have been accompanied by a terms-of-trade gain to the borrower,
if repayment implies a loss.
10Their analysis thus provides part of the explanation of why lenders
wish to cut bad borrowers off from credit.
11Identification of the regimes is difficult because theory suggests
that almost all variables influencing the desired debt should also58
influence the credit ceiling, and conversely. Eaton and Gersovitz
use restrictions on the signs of coefficients as well as the fact
that when the credit ceiling is binding it affects desired reserves.
A further possibility is to assign certain countries to different
regimes with probability one based on prior knowledge, something
that may be attractive now that cases of apparently intractable
debtors have emerged.
12Several recent papers have attempted to model this idea formally.
See, in particular, Kletzer (1984), and Sachs and Cohen (1985) who
provide models in which rescheduling agreements prohibit the borrow-
er from tapping sources of credit other than the initial lenders.
The likelihood of the ultimate repayment of the initial loan amount
is consequently enhanced. What is not clear in the analysis is why
a long-term loan agreement could not attain the same objective by
prohibiting the borrower from borrowing from other sources during
the term of the loan.
13With complete contracting, repayments would be a function of the
state, just as they are with incomplete contracting, but the
dependence would be specified ex ante. The following discussion
notes some of the differences that arise in the nature of the
relationship between debtors and creditors with incomplete
contracting.